#github

Wiz reported on October 25 that the Gheist campaign used stolen GitHub tokens from infostealer logs and past supply-chain leaks to plant more than 13,500 ci-sync branches across 850+ accounts, printing every repository secret into Actions logs in base32 and deleting the runs.

LiteLLM's October 23 attack-chain report says an Agent Platform admin key committed to a public repo on May 27 was deleted but never revoked. On October 10 it returned a GitHub org owner's unscoped CLI OAuth token, which led to stolen maintainer tokens and the 1.107.0 release.

OpenSourceMalware found a fake GitHub security alert that proxied a maintainer's password and 2FA code, then silently completed an OAuth device flow for repo, workflow and read:org scopes. A second stage planted a credential stealer named fa-solid-400.woff2 in 94 repositories.

GitGuardian counts more than 30,000 repositories and about 1,900 compromised GitHub accounts in GhostAction's October wave, which committed workflows that dump Actions secrets and scan git history for credentials. Some victims were hit in 2025 and never rotated.